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THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONTRACT TYPE  
USED IN DEFENSE ACQUISITION  





The goal in this project was to research and write an historical overview of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition policy toward preference in a particular 
contract type. Major milestones and representative case studies were reviewed that 
challenge the current acquisition policy in regard to the type of contract selected for 
major defense weapon systems. 
In this project, historical and analytical accounts of the defense acquisition 
process are provided for major weapon systems from 1947 to present. Significant 
changes were examined to acquisition policies to show any possible trends. Major studies 
were conducted to determine what factors contribute to policy changes associated with 
noteworthy cases involving major weapon systems.  
By highlighting trends and making insightful observations, we hope to provide 
acquisition professionals who work with major weapon systems with greater perspective 
and context on the debate over the most appropriate contract type for use in major 
weapon systems. 
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Preference for a certain type of government contract has varied since the 
Department of Defense (DoD) formed in 19471. Policy makers have tended to favor 
either cost reimbursement (CR) type contracts or fixed-price (FP) type contracts for 
various reasons. This paper explores factors that have influenced historical preference for 
a certain contract type and seeks to identify trends that could provide useful insight to 
Defense Acquisition policy makers. 
On March 4, 2009, as government contracting appeared to struggle with cost 
overruns, schedule delays and an overall lack of performance, President Obama issued a 
memorandum on government contracting intended to prevent inefficiencies and further 
wasteful spending. In his memorandum, the President pointed out the current federal 
contracting trend of excessively relying on “sole-source contracts and cost-
reimbursement contracts creates a risk that taxpayer funds will be spent on contracts that 
are wasteful, inefficient, subject to misuse, or otherwise not well designed…”. The memo 
urged agencies to limit the use of CR contracting and promoted FP contracting (Sacilotto, 
2011).  
On July 29, 2009, as directed by the Presidential memorandum, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance to government agencies on reviewing 
existing contracts and procurement (OMB, 2009). To implement the guidance from the 
President and OMB, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) for the DoD established the 
Better Buying Power (BBP) policy, memorandum and guidance for achieving greater 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending on September 14, 2010. The BBP  
 
 
                                                 
1 The National Military Establishment was created in 1947, and it was renamed as the Department of 
Defense (DoD) by the amendment to the National Security Act of 1949. 
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policy emphasized the increased use of fixed-price incentive firm target (FPIF) contracts 
and contained specific guidance for delivering better value to the taxpayer and warfighter 
(USD [AT&L], 2010a; USD [AT&L], 2010b).  
On March 16, 2011, the Defense Acquisition Regulation Council (DARC) and the 
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC) issued an interim Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) rule that increased oversight and called for additional contract 
documentation requirement and justification on all services when using CR contracts 
(Sacilotto, 2011). Moreover, on October 12, 2011, Senator McCain introduced Senate 
Bill 1694, Defense Cost-Type Contracting Reform Act of 2011, to limit the use of cost-
type contracts by the DoD for major acquisition programs. 
In April 2011, the Center for Strategic Studies published Cost and Time Overruns 
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and presented the findings that indicated FP 
contracts have on average less cost growth than cost-type contracts, as shown in Figure 1 
(Berteau, Ben-Ari, Hofbauer, Sanders, Ellman, & Morrow, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 1.   Cost Overruns by Contract Type. (From Berteau et al., 2011) 
According to the Center for Strategic Studies, cost-plus contracts seem to be the 
driving factor for cost overruns. Both cost-plus award and incentive type contracts have  
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high average cost overrun percentage compared to the fixed price contract. This report 
also mentioned that FP contracts are more commonly used for mature technology and 
considered being low on risk (Berteau et al., 2011).  
Contract-type preference is a multivariate debate. The contract type itself may not 
be the root cause of a cost overruns, schedule delay and performance deficiency. Rather, 
the wrong choice of contract type for a particular procurement may be the root cause of 
the problem. Each contract type can appear better than the other when used properly. For 
example, a CR contract may best be appropriate for a R&D contract, while a FP contract 
may best be appropriate for a production contract. Extreme cost overruns can distort 
quantified data and thrust a program into public scrutiny. In this paper, we compare 
historical trends in the use of contract type to relevant financial, economic, industrial, and 
output measures.  
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
In conducting this research, our objective was to document and quantify historical 
trends for preferences in contract type. On the surface, it appears that acquisition policy 
repeats itself. We identified trends based on the findings and recommendations of 
significant studies conducted on defense acquisition and the acquisition of major weapon 
systems; we began our review of these studies with the establishment of the DoD in 1947 
to the present. By highlighting trends and making insightful observations, we hope this 
project will provide acquisition professionals who work with major weapon systems a 
greater perspective on the debate over the most appropriate contract type for use in major 
weapon systems. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following is our primary research question:  
 Is the most recent preference, beginning in 2009, for FP contracting 




Our secondary research questions include the following: 
 What are the historical indicators for the DoD’s cyclical preference for 
certain types of contracts? 
 
 Is the DoD’s preference for FP contracts responsive to changes in total 
defense budget authority? 
 
 Is the DoD’s preference for FP contracts responsive to prevailing trends in 
acquisition reform literature? 
 
 Is the DoD’s preference for FP contracts responsive to growth or decline 
in the economy? 
 
 Is the DoD’s preference for FP contracts responsive to growth or decline 
in the defense industry, and what is the likely or potential impact of such 
preference on the defense industry? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research was conducted for this project through literary searches into the history 
of defense acquisition, focusing on major weapon systems. We collected research data 
from various sources, including Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, DoD directives and publications, and 
other scholarly writings.  
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this project comprises the following research activities, which are 
described by chapter: 
1. Chapter I defines the issue of contract type related to defense acquisition, 
identifies research questions, and develops methodologies that frame our 
research efforts. 
 
2. Chapter II conducts a literature review of select acquisition reform 
initiatives and major studies from 1947 to the present. 
 
3. Chapter III reviews the unique aspects of the defense weapons 
marketplace. 
 
4. Chapter IV reviews historical defense acquisition policies, studies, and 
case histories. 
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5. Chapter V analyzes the trends, issues, contributing factors, and 
effectiveness of historical acquisition reform. 
 
6. Chapter VI answers the research questions, proposes relevant 
recommendations, and discusses possible areas for future research.  
 
We recognize the following limitations to our study: 
1. Major weapon systems contracts typically utilize more than one contract 
type. In this project, we focus on the predominant contract type used based 
on historical precedent. 
 
2. Research of major weapon systems acquisition reform has been 
extensively documented by many other researchers and authors, as 
reflected in Appendix A. In this project, we use only the literature that has 
most significantly influenced or shaped the acquisition process.  
 
3. In this project, we do not include surveys or interviews to examine the 
perceptions of current defense decision makers in government and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The amount of literature addressing the topics of contract type and major weapon 
systems is immense. Across the history of DoD, there always seems to be a prominent 
Defense Acquisition case (Chapter IV examines significant cases). Figure 2 is a chart 
from Google Books Ngram Viewer that shows how the use of the terms contract type and 
major weapon system has changed over time. Figure 2 shows the percentage each term 
was used in published American literature from 1947–2008. The use of the term major 




Figure 2.   Use of the Terms Contract Type and Major Weapon System in American 
Literature from 1947–2008. (From Michel et al., 2011) 
The Google Ngram Viewer tool normalizes the data so that the number of books 
used in the calculation does not skew the results. The chart in Figure 2 only reflects data 
published in English and in the United States. The term smoothing refers to the number of 
years grouped as a moving average. A smoothing of 0 reflects raw data. A smoothing of 
2 for the year 2000 would include the years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.  
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Figure 3, with a smoothing of 0, shows precisely when the use of the term 
contract type peaked in American literature.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Use of the Term Contract Type in American Literature. (From Michel et al., 
2011) 
Figure 4 shows how often the terms fixed-price contract, cost-plus contract, and 
cost-reimbursement contract appear in American literature. Clearly, the mid-1960s to 
early 1970s was a noteworthy period. Not only did use of the term fixed-price contract 
surge, but also use of the term cost-reimbursement contract was more frequent than use 




Figure 4.   Use of the Terms Fixed-Price Contract, Cost-Plus Contract, and Cost-
Reimbursement Contract in American Literature. (From Michel et al., 2011) 
Figures 5 and 6 also show that use of the term fixed-price contract appears to 
have a higher correlation to the use of the term contract type than to the use of the term 
cost-plus contract or cost-reimbursement contract.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Use of the Term Contract Type Compared to Fixed-Price Contract in 
American Literature from 1947–2008. (From Michel et al., 2011) 
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Figure 6.   Use of the Term Contract Type Compared to Use of the Terms Cost-
Reimbursement Contract and Cost-Plus Contract in American Literature from 
1947–2008. (From Michel et al., 2011) 
In addition to identifying cultural trends by using published literature in Google 
Ngram, we identified significant initiatives that have contributed to how the DoD 
acquires major weapon systems. Lists of significant acquisition reform initiatives have 
previously been compiled by industry experts. The list we compiled in Appendix A of 
this paper includes some of the same initiatives as those listed by industry experts; 
however, we have included additional acquisition reform studies on our list. 
B. TYPES OF CONTRACTS 
There are two major categories of contract types that are generally used, FP 
contracts and CR contracts. FP contracts tend to be more risky to the contractors as far as 
the cost and performance are concern. CR contracts tend to be more risky to the 
government as cost and performance are often not defined or matured.  
1. Fixed-Price (FP) Contracts 
For FP contract types, the contractor is obligated to deliver the products and 
services at the price agreed upon with the government. The total price should not exceed 
the amount stipulated in the contract (Leisenring, 2004). Darst and Roberts (2010) state 
that FFP contracts carry more risk for the contractor than for the government and that 
great cost control and efficiency are the key factors to achieving the maximum profit  
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(Darst & Roberts, 2010). FFP contracts required less administrative work for contractor 
and limit government’s oversight during the performance (Darst & Roberts, 2010, p. 20). 
Table 1 differentiates variations of FP contracts.  
Table 1. Comparison of Fixed-Price Contract Types. (From Leisenring, 2004) 
 
 
2. Cost-Reimbursement (CR) Contracts 
Under a CR contract the contractor obligates to deliver their best effort to provide the 
products and services outlined in the contract (Leisenring, 2004). CR contracts place less risk on 
the contractor since all allowable costs get paid by the government and fees are 
embedded within the contract to further incentivize the contactor when cost savings are 
observed. CR contracts should be used to acquire requirements that are not fully defined 
or where technologies are not fully developed or matured. Table 2 differentiates variations 
of CR contracts. 
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Table 2. Variations of Cost-Reimbursement Contract Types.  
(From Leisenring, 2004) 
 
 
C. WHAT IS A WEAPON SYSTEM? 
Fox (1988) defined weapon system in his book, The Defense Management 
Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, as follows: 
Weapon system is often used interchangeably with major weapon systems 
or major programs. “The term weapon systems—or often major weapon 
systems or major programs—refer to technically complex items such as 
aircrafts, missiles, ships, and tanks. A weapon system includes not only 
the major item of equipment itself but also the subsystems, logistical 
support, software, construction, and training needed to operate and support 
it.” (p. 9)  
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D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
In his paper, A Study on Improving Defense Acquisition Through the Application 
of Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Concept to Defense 
Industry Workforce, Choi (2009) briefly stated the history of defense acquisition as 
follows:  
The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long and inconsistent history of 
defense acquisition program successes and failures. When the programs 
and projects fail, causing cost overruns, schedule delays and performance 
shortfalls both the warfighters and taxpayers are at loss. The repeated and 
growing failures in defense acquisition over the past decades, have been 
well documented and reported in numerous Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and various 
other agency reports, along with Congressional panels and commissions. 
The recurring and cited causes are: unclearly stated, inaccessible, and 
changing needs and requirements; unstable year to year funding; 
congressional and bureaucratic meddling; poorly established and tracked 
baseline; and insufficient investment in systems engineering and program 
management. Numerous studies and examinations have also produced 
similar observations regarding systemic shortfalls and recommended fixes. 
While the DoD’s acquisition policies and directives adopted many of the 
most substantive findings and recommendations of these reviews, the 
people managing the process lacked the will to carry through and 
implement them in program decisions; (p. 1) 
E. SUMMARY 
There is an immense amount of research in literature on acquisition reform and 
the acquisition of major weapon systems. This chapter identifies historical trends in 
American literature, using the Google Ngram tool, of key acquisition terms. Additionally, 
more details on Defense Acquisition initiatives that have influenced how the DoD 
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III. THE DEFENSE MARKETPLACE 
A. DEFENSE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
The market of the defense industry in the United States is different than the 
commercial marketplace in a number of respects. Lorell, Lowell, Kennedy, and Levaux 
(2000) defined the uniqueness of the U.S. defense market in two ways. First, the U.S. 
defense market for weapon systems is characterized by a single buyer (Lorell et al., 2000, 
p. 13). “The second distinguishing feature of the weapons market is that it is 
characterized by a higher degree of technical complexity and innovation than most 
commercial product markets” (Lorell et al., 2000, p. 14). These two distinct 
characteristics make the defense marketplace inherently more risky than the commercial 
marketplace (Lorell et al., 2000, p. 14).  
Gansler, Lucyshyn and Arendt (2009) compared other distinctive factors of the 
defense market and commercial market in Table 3. 
Table 3. Evaluation of the Commercial Marketplace vs. Defense Marketplace. 




B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
In his paper, The U.S. Industrial Base: Past, Present and Future, Barry D. Watts 
(2008) divided the defense industry into three periods: (1) the “Growth” Period, (2) the 
“Mature” Period, and (3) the “Restructuring” Period. His time series analysis of the 
defense industry forms the foundation of analysis found later in Chapter V. Watts (2008) 
explained these periods in the following way: 
These   periods   roughly   parallel   the emergence of the Cold War, its 
prosecution, and the industry’s efforts to deal with the security 
environment that emerged after the Cold War ended. The boundaries 
between these periods are not precise, and within each period there were 
developments that affected the U.S. industrial base, including military 
conflicts, fluctuations in defense spending, the introduction of new 
technologies, and emergence of new types of systems. Nevertheless, 
each period has distinct characteristics in terms of customer interest and 
actions, overall government buying practices, and the size and structure of 
the industrial base. (p. 9) 
1. Watts’ Growth Period: 1948–1960 
In describing the conditions of what he labeled the Growth Period, Watts (2008) 
writes the following: 
The years 1948 to 1960 saw the establishment of America’s first large-
scale peacetime military force. Investments in research and 
development (R&D) and procurement to outfit that force occurred along 
with corresponding increases in annual funding for national defense. 
These developments led to the emergence of a large set of private-sector 
companies supporting the U.S. military. 
…As with any emerging industrial sector, the early years were dynamic 
ones of change and expansion, including the entry and exit of many 
companies. Barriers to entry were “relatively low compared to much of 
manufacturing,” because of the “high rate of technological change.”23… 
By the end of the 1950s many enduring characteristics of the defense 
industry were beginning to take forms that were to govern it for the next 
forty to fifty years. The barriers to entry and exit from the defense industry 
were rising. As one study noted, “It is especially significant that once 
firms entered the weapons industry, the process is not easily reversed.”41 
Increasingly, the uniqueness of the products and services of the industry 
and the buying habits of the government were to separate the defense 
industry from others in the American economy.42 (pp. 13, 14, 18) 
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2. Watts’ Mature Period: 1961–1990 
In describing the characteristics of what he labeled the Mature Period, Watts 
(2008) writes: 
From 1961 to 1990, the U.S. defense establishment focused on the Soviet 
Union as the major challenge to American security and the principal 
indicator of the adequacy of the U.S. military. The various classes of 
major systems that had begun gaining prominence from 1945 to 1960 
continued to be central components of U.S. military forces through 1990.  
The U.S. military also began giving greater emphasis to operational art 
and joint operations and developed new approaches to combat such as 
“AirLand Battle” and precision strike. A related trend that influenced 
many system development efforts was greater attention to improving 
connectivity, standardization, interoperability, reliability, and 
maintainability. (pp. 18–19). 
3. Watt’s Restructuring Period: 1991–2007 
In describing the characteristics of what he labeled the Restructuring Period, 
Watts writes: 
The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the 
international security environment in which the U.S. defense industry 
had operated for more than thirty years. The United States no longer 
faced a “near-peer” superpower rival whose nuclear forces posed an 
existential threat to America, and what remained of the Cold War’s bi-
partisan consensus on national security rapidly disappeared… 
The rise of challenges quite different from those that dominated U.S. 
national security during the Cold War, together with the desire for 
defense transformation and expensive combat experience in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, have altered the mix of systems and services demanded  
by the American military.  In the absence of a major new strategic 
direction, certain products retained their importance, although their  
size, composition and growth rates often changed. The emergence  
of new warfighting concepts (Network Centric Warfare, Effects  
Based Operations, Cyber war, etc.) and battlefield experience increased 
the military’s emphasis on integrating capabilities across the diverse 
systems, warfighting communities, and the military Services 
themselves. (pp. 26–27) 
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4. The U.S. Defense Industry Today 
In describing the characteristics of the U.S. defense industry today, Watts (2008) 
writes: 
Structural changes in the defense industry from the mid-1980s to the 
present, together with the US government’s actions affecting the industry, 
reduced the number of firms capable of competing in any one defense 
product or service area; further, the size and scope of surviving firms 
changed along with the relationships between these firms and the US 
government.96 The general result has been to restrict the Defense 
Department’s choice of suppliers for major programs to, at most, two or 
three of the prime contractors…. 
The overall result is that the government now deals with companies that 
have a mix of vertical and horizontal capacities and of cross-company 
ties. Companies may be able to build ships, submarines, armored and 
light combat vehicles, but also be able to build major subsystems for 
their platforms. Depending on the program, companies may see the need 
to pick another firm as a supplier because of ties to that firm in other 
businesses, and not because that firm provides the best subsystem or 
component. Consequently, the government has to broaden its scope in 
awarding contracts if it wants to shape the future structure of the 











IV. CONTRACT TYPE TRENDS 
A 1947–1964: CR PERIOD, THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
Lessons learned from WWII significantly transformed the U.S. military. In 
an effort to consolidate defense, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National 
Military Establishment (NME), which combined both the Department of War and the 
Department of the Navy. Two years later the NME was renamed to the Department of 
Defense (DoD) by the National Security Act of 1949. The National Security Act of 1949 
unified all services under one control.  
Following WWII, the U.S. defense industry developed many new weapon 
systems, which attributed to an increased spending in research and development (R&D) 
(Sacilotto, 2011, p. 686). From 1947 to 1964, R&D spending grew by 371 percent as a 
percentage of DoD total budget authority (TBA), or gross defense spending (National 
Defense Budget Estimate, 2011). A major area of focus was on the development of major 
missile programs. (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 686) The defense budget was authorized to develop 
nearly any weapon system that would give the United States the power to surpass its 
challengers (Fox, 2011, p. 9). During the Korean War, between 1950–1952, DoD TBA 
averaged $521B, which was 44 percent higher on average than the other 15 years of this 
period (National Defense Budget Estimates, 2011). 
U.S. troops arrived in South Vietnam in 1961 following the signing of a 
military and economic aid treaty between the U.S. and Vietnam (Tulalip Tribes, 2003). 
However, the defense budget would not expand until 1965 when 200,000 troops were 
deployed there (Vietnam War, 2007). 
b. Industry Environment 
The need to produce war supplies had given rise to a huge military-
industrial complex (a term coined by Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as the U.S. 
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president from 1953 through 1961) (Conte & Karr, 2001). Between 1947–1964, U.S. 
gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of countries productivity, expanded by 272 
percent (BEA, 2011). Conte and Karr (2001) describe the U.S. industrial environment of 
the time: 
Many Americans feared that the end of World War II and the subsequent 
drop in military spending might bring back the hard times of the Great 
Depression. But instead, pent-up consumer demand fueled exceptionally 
strong economic growth in the post war period. The automobile industry 
successfully converted back to producing cars, and new industries such as 
aviation and electronics grew by leaps and bounds. A housing boom, 
stimulated in part by easily affordable mortgages for returning members of 
the military, added to the expansion…  At the same time, the jump in 
postwar births, known as the "baby boom," increased the number of 
consumers. (p. 17)   
2. Cost Reimbursement 
After WWII, cost plus contracts were widely used for development programs. 
Most of the initial development contracts, however, were sole source and tend to caused 
significant cost growth (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 686). The DoD was looking for the most 
technologically advanced weapon systems. As a result, the majority of the defense 
contracts were awarded as sole source or with more than 40 percent being CPFF 
contracts. (Fox, 2011, p. 9)  In his article Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An 
Elusive Goal, Fox (2011) cites David Acker, in his article, The Maturing of the DoD 
Acquisition Process: Defense systems Management Review, to characterize the Defense 
Acquisition environment of the 1950s: 
Such considerations as “should cost,” “design-to-cost,” and “life-cycle 
cost” were not uppermost in the minds of defense planners until the late 
1950s. Both development and production were carried out under cost-
reimbursement contracts. In this environment, production costs did not 
pose a major constraint on engineering design. When a design was 
discovered to be impractical in production—or to be inoperative in field 
use—it was modified in accordance with government funded engineering 
changes. . . . 
The lack of a well-organized and integrated DoD financial management 
system, along with the practice of “piecemeal” procurement, led to 
unstable employment in the defense industry and the emergence of a 
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transient work force. Many of the contractors being challenged to develop 
and produce defense systems on the outer fringes of technology found it 
difficult to create and maintain smoothly functioning program 
management teams. (p. 9)  
In 1961, Robert McNamara became SECDEF and immediately strove to end cost-
based contracts (Bright, 1978). The subsequent shift to FP contracting, though, did not 
become engrained within DoD until 1965 in the new form of contracting called Total 
Package Procurement (TPP). 
3. Significant Case: General Dynamic’s F-111 Aardvark 
The DoD’s pursuit of the most effective weaponry often experienced technical 
problems, cost overruns, and delays in production. Such was the case for General 
Dynamic’s F-111 Aardvark. The F-111 program consisted of two definitized contracts for 
R&D and for the production contract, both of which were FPIF type (TFX F-111A/ 
Source Selection, 1963).  
The F-111 contract represented a decided shift away from CR contracting. In his 
book, The Jet Makers, Dr. Charles Bright describes the three stages of SECDEF 
McNamara’s procurement ideas, “The F-111 contract competition was chosen by 
McNamara for his second step: to assert civilian dominance over procurement. Before the 
F-111, the USAF's multilayered selection and review arrangement, capped by the Air 
Council, had controlled procurement” (Bright, 1978).  
The F-111 was designed to meet both Air Force and Navy requirements for a jet 
fighter. The Air Force required a supersonic tactical fighter bomber, and the Navy needed 
a carrier-based fleet defense interceptor. The F-111’s multi-purpose and difficult to 
achieve requirements made the F-111 development extremely expensive, risky and hard 
to manage (Richey, n.d.). During the planning phase of F-111, the planner gave priority 
to Air Force requirements and tried to tailor Navy’s requirements which led the Navy to 
give up the project because F-111 failed to meet the specification that Navy needed 
(Richey, n.d.).  
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Due to its complex development requirements and functionality, the production 
cost for F-111 reached $6.3 million, which exceeded the estimated cost of $4.5 million 
per aircraft. Consequently, DoD produced 50 percent fewer aircraft than had originally 
been planned.  
In spite of all its technical problems and cost overrun, ironically, the F-111 
Aardvark’s performance record is considered one of the safest in USAF history for an all-
weather interdiction aircraft (Richey, n.d.). 
4. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
a. First Hoover Commission, 1949 
The same year DoD formed, in 1947, President Harry S. Truman 
authorized the first Hoover Commission, which sought to reorganize the Executive 
Branch. The commission forwarded its 273 recommendations to Congress in a series of 
nineteen separate reports in 1949. Most notably, the commission addressed the role of the 
SECDEF and questions about what the overarching structure of the American military 
should be (Gholz, McKinney, & Sapolsky 1994). The commission was officially 
terminated on June 12, 1949. 
b. Second Hoover Commission, 1955 
The Second Hoover Commission sought further improvements upon the 
Executive Branch. Mostly notably, the commercial industry was used as a model to shape 
governmental operations. 
In their paper, Acquisition Reform-Lean 94-03, Gholz, McKinney, and 
Sapolsky (1994) described the Second Hoover Commission as follows: 
The Second Hoover Commission Commission…examined the defense 
procurement process in greater depth, although it was primarily concerned 
with achieving efficiencies in the purchase of commodity goods, such as 
soap or mops, rather than reviewing how advanced weapon systems were 
produced. The second Hoover Commission is notable for conceiving the 




military organization. This mode of thinking—adopting commercial 
practices for the government—has been a nearly pervasive feature of 
subsequent acquisition reform plans (n.p.). 
c. The Weapons Acquisition Process Study by the Harvard 
Business School, 1962 and 1964 
In 1962 and 1964, two innovative books on the development of advanced 
weapons were released: The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, by 
Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, and The Weapons Acquisition Process: An 
Economic Incentive, by Frederic M. Scherer (Fox, 2011, p. 35). The first book, The 
Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis, described the basic structure of the 
acquisition process and presented a comprehensive economic analysis (Fox, 2011, p. 35). 
Groundbreaking research defined the market system that made the weapons acquisition 
process so unique.  
In his article, Priced-Based Acquisition: Where in Federal Contracting? 
Edwards (1999) quotes Peck and Scherer: 
It is not only that a market system does not now exist in the weapons 
acquisition process. We can state the proposition more strongly. A market 
system in its entirety can never exist for the acquisition of weapons. (n.p.) 
Four reasons to support Peck and Scherer’s conclusion (Edwards, 1999). 
 Weapons development requires such large expenditures that 
contractors are unable to obtain private financing. The government 
has to finance weapons development. 
 The financing problem is exacerbated by the many unique 
uncertainties associated with weapons development, both technical 
and political, which repel stockholders and other investors. 
 Centralized planning is essential to determining weapon system 
performance and design requirements, but centralized planning is 
inconsistent with a market system. 
 The government is the only buyer of weapon systems, so the many 
buyers, many sellers dynamic of a market system is not present to 
set prices.” (n.p.)  
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The second book, The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic 
Incentive, focuses on economic incentives inherent in Defense Acquisition. J. Ronald Fox 
(2011) states that Scherer examined the following six specific problems in the weapon 
acquisition process:  
 Schedule slippage,  
 Cost growth,  
 Lack of qualified government personnel,  
 High frequency of personnel turnover,  
 Inadequate methods of cost estimation, and  
 Insufficient training in the measurement and control of contractor 
performance. (p. 35) 
d. The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), Public Law 87 653, 1962   
TINA allows contracting officers to better determine price reasonableness 
on all proposals over $700,000. The Act requires contractors to provide certified cost or 
pricing data. The cost or pricing data should be accurate, current and complete. Data 
should be factual, not judgmental and verifiable, such as vendor quotations, nonrecurring 
costs, information on purchasing volume, and related operations costs, etc. Exceptions to 
TINA are when there is adequate price competition (two or more offers), price set by law 
or regulation, acquisition of a commercial item, or where a waiver has been granted.  
B 1965–1969: FP PERIOD, THE TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT 
PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
On March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South 
Vietnam; the number of troops was increased to nearly 200,000 by December of the same 





with guerilla tactics (Vietnam War, 2007). Military losses were increasing, and 
Americans began to question why the U.S. was in this war in the first place (Vietnam 
War, 2007).  
In March 1968, SECDEF McNamara left the Pentagon after serving more 
than seven years in the position. After McNamara’s departure, cost, schedule, and 
performance issues combined with the failure of the Total Package Procurement (TPP) 
concept, prompted President Richard M. Nixon to appoint the Blue Ribbon Defense 
Panel, or Fitzhugh Commission, in 1970 (Fox, 2011, p. 40). The Panel would examine 
the weapons development process in great detail.  
b. Industry Environment 
The defense industry expanded in response to increased demands of the 
Vietnam War. Between 1965–1970, the defense budget grew by 22 percent from the 
proceeding five- year period (National Defense Budget Estimate, 2011). In his book The 
Defense Industry, Jacques S. Gansler (1982) described the U.S. defense industry as 
“going through major changes in the mid-1960s that paralleled the increase in purchasing 
for the Vietnam War and the subsequent decline in spending as U.S. participation ended.” 
He continues stating: 
Conglomerates became interested in buying into the industry in the 1960s 
because of its large R&D levels, long production runs and counter-cyclical 
characteristics. In the mid-1960s firms incurred substantial levels of debt 
to expand “plant and tooling” to respond to the demands stemming from 
the war. (p. 138) 
2. Fixed Price 
In 1965, the Total Package Procurement (TPP) concept emerged as a form of FP 
contracting. The concept of TPP is to combine the design, development and production as 
a package and using FP contract. The goal of this concept was to prevent the contractor 
from proposing an unrealistic low bid to get the contract and compensating themselves 
during the production phase, which was the major cause for cost overrun. Additional 
anticipated benefits of TPP were contractor’s commitment to cost, efficiency in 
performance and production, and ample competition (Sacilotto, 2011, pp. 688–689). All 
 26
these benefits were supposedly to promote efficiency in all aspect of program. However, 
the intended benefits and goals of TPP were not achieved, instead both government and 
contractor suffered from unintended disputes, cost growth and losses. Due to the 
unsuccessful outcome of C-5A trial and unpleasant experiences with TPP, this concept 
was eventually abandoned (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 683). 
3. Significant Cases: Lockheed C-5A Galaxy 
The USAF C-5A Galaxy was the first program to use TPP. The C-5A was 
intended to transport over-sized and heavy cargos that other aircraft could not. As the 
first major weapon system that used TPP, the C-5A contract, a firm-priced incentive fee, 
included a provision to mitigate the risk between the Lockheed and government. 
Lockheed was responsible for the overall system development and General Electric was 
responsible for the aircraft engines. From the beginning, Lockheed experienced both a 
schedule delay and a performance shortfall due to an aircraft weight increase that 
exceeded system design limitations. This design flaw led to an extensive redesign effort. 
Ultimately, the C-5A program suffered major cost growth and reached the point that 
Lockheed could not continue the performance due to the financial issues. The C-5A 
contract was converted to a CR contract and the use of TPP was henceforth. The failure 
of TPP led to the acquisition policy favoring the use of CR contract for development 
efforts (Sacilotto, 2011, pp. 689–691). In her article, “Déjà vu All over Again: Cost-
Reimbursement Contracts Fall out of Favor Again, But Should They?” Kara Sacilotto 
(2011) quoted GAO: 
The Lockheed contract was an FPIF contract with a target cost of 
approximately $1.7 billion, a target price of approximately $1.945 billion, 
and a ceiling price of approximately $2.3 billion…  
In 1967, approximately two years after award, the USAF issued Lockheed 
a cure notice regarding the deficiencies in the aircraft and threatened to 
terminate the contracts for default…  
…Regarding the use of the TPPC, the GAO stated: It should be 
recognized that the C-5A program was the first major weapon system 




preliminary conclusion indicates that this method may be best suited for 
the procurement of those systems requiring only limited additional 
development effort…. 
It seems clear that the Government prior to contracting for significant 
production units under a fixed pricing arrangement should have real 
assurance that the item can be produced and the costs can be predicted 
with reasonable accuracy. (pp. 689–691) 
4. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
There was no significant Acquisition reform initiative published during this 
period. Following SECDEF McNamara’s departure in 1968, and the seismic shift away 
from FP (TPP) contracting, President Nixon appointed the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, or 
Fitzhugh Commission, in 1970. 
C. 1970–1980: CR PERIOD, THE POST MCNAMARA PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
Throughout the Cold War, the DoD procured weapon systems to 
sufficiently deter the Soviet Union and its allies. This imposing threat dictated the 
spending in weapon system acquisition. Performance was the primary concern when 
developing new weapon systems followed closely by schedule concerns. As a result, the 
requirement drove performance, schedule and cost (Tyson, 1998, p. I–4).  
In 1975, the last American troops departed Vietnam concluding the U.S. 
presence there (The History Place, 1999). Deaths of American troops totaled 58,193 
(National Archives, 2007). 
Between 1970 and 1980, DoD TBA averaged $402 billion, 22 percent less 
than that of the preceding Total Package Procurement Period (National Defense Budget 
Estimates, 2011). When budgets were not enough to procure required systems, often 
times the quantity was reduced to fit the budget, not the performance (Tyson, 1998, p. I–
4).  
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b. Industry Environment 
During the Post McNamara Period, DoD placed increasing demands on 
the defense industry. The defense industry was forced to concentrate on unique weapon 
systems provided by DoD (Tyson, 1998, p. I-4). While major weapon systems became 
increasingly complex, DoD TBA declined. National Security objectives did not appear to 
align with the reality of a reduced defense budget. New technologies demanded by the 
DoD required predominately CR contracts due to unknown development and production 
cycles. The unattractive high level of risk with developing new technologies and a lower 
DoD TBA discouraged participation in the defense industry. As government continued to 
impose high regulations and cumbersome processes to the commercial industry in 
development of weapon systems, some companies were reluctant to do business with 
DoD (Tyson, 1998, p. I–5).  
Watts (2008) in his paper, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present 
and Future, describes the U.S. defense industry in 1970s: 
Since the 1970s, American defense firms have increasingly adopted 
management practices from the commercial sector. These practices have 
resulted in the strategic goals of many defense firms more closely 
resembling those of commercial firms. Top managers of many defense 
firms have found themselves concentrating more and more on bottom-line 
financial returns for their shareholders, increasing their share of the 
market, and eliminating competition…(pp. 2-3) 
When purchases fell rapidly after the war and interest rates climbed in the 
1970s, many firms encountered significant cash flow problems. Several 
required assistance from the government to survive (e.g., loan guarantees 
to Lockheed). Not surprisingly, Wall Street became pessimistic about the 
companies and downgraded their stocks… 
In light of these changes, in the 1970s many defense firms began seeking 
sales outside of DoD to reduce their overall dependence on defense 
contracts while, at the same time, protecting their existing defense 
programs… 
Finally, companies began to limit their exposure to defense spending. 
Some acquired firms in other industries, and some isolated their defense 
businesses from their non-defense businesses. The collective impact of all 
these actions was that the leading firms decreased their dependence on 
government spending, the subcontractor base declined, and the number of 
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major builders of certain systems declined. By 1980 many companies 
appear to have been wary of having defense revenues as a major part of 
company sales. (p. 23) 
2. Cost Reimbursement 
Due to the failure of TPP in the 1960s, the use of FFP contracts on development 
programs was discouraged. In the 1970s, the DoD favored use of CR contracts on large 
R&D projects because of the uncertainties and cost growth experienced from FP 
contracts (Fox, 2003).  
In his book, Acquisition of Defense System, Przemieniecki, J. (1993) explains the 
contract type trends of the 1970s: 
Based on the large overruns encountered under McNamara, Packard also 
moved the DoD back towards CR and incentive contracting. This, 
unfortunately, did little to help control the cost overruns that DoD was 
experiencing. Packard left office in 1971, dissatisfied with the lack of 
success of most of his initiatives. (p. 15)  
3. Significant Cases: F/A-18 Hornet 
The F/A-18 Hornet program started in 1976 with a production schedule of 1,377 
aircraft and soon experienced significant cost growth. The cost increases resulted in 
multiple program redesigns and fluctuations in procurement quantities (GAO, 1980). 
There are several factors that caused the cost growth in F/A-18 Hornet program, such as 
contractor production problems, difficulties in system development, and unforeseen 
factors (GAO, 1980). 
In his paper, Requirements and Cost Stability: A Case Study of the E/A-18 Hornet 
Program, CDR Jay D. Bottelson (2011) writes: 
the program dealt with several major obstacles in the form of 
escalation/inflation costs and the inability of the aircraft to meet required 
specifications. Though the escalation costs did not detract from the ability 
to see the program through to the end, they gave the perception of a 
program that was not being managed properly and was being deliberately 
understated in order to continue to receive funding. Additionally, though 




IOC and success in the fleet, concern remains over the reasoning behind 
accepting less than what was called for in the contract specifications. 
(p.401)  
4. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
a. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission), 1970 
As Defense Acquisition continued to face cost growth, schedule delay and 
performance shortfalls on major weapon system procurement, in 1970, the Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) was appointed (Fox, 2011, p. 40).  
Ethan McKinney, Eugene Gholz, and Harvey M. Sapolsky (1994), in their 
paper, Acquisition Reform-Lean 94-03 described the Fitzhugh Commission as follows: 
In 1970 the Fitzhugh Commission met for the first time. The Fitzhugh 
Commission involved the first detailed examination of the weapons 
development process by an independent, government-sponsored panel. As 
such, it offered a number of recommendations for changing the 
development strategies the Services followed.  
In contrast to the two Hoover Commissions, the Fitzhugh Commission 
spent little time on commodity items or joint purchasing and instead 
focused firmly on weapon systems. The Fitzhugh Commission was also 
the first major commission to address the political environment of defense 
acquisition, if only in a limited way, with a warning that Congress was 
developing a tendency to micromanage the DoD. (n.p.)  
In its report, the Fitzhugh Commission appeared to analyze the existing 
major weapon system acquisition process from industry’s point of view. This report also 
noted that overall deficiencies in acquisition process as a whole create the basis for cost 
overrun, schedule delay and performance shortfalls and blamed the existing acquisition 
directive, Directive 3200.9 from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (Fox, 2011, 
p. 64). 
b. Commission on Government Procurement, 1972  
The Commission on Government Procurement provided recommendations 
that led to the establishment of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and 
what was to become the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The OFPP plays a major 
role in providing overall guidance and direction for government procurement policies, 
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regulations and procedures and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in government 
acquisition processes. The OFPP reviews and makes appropriate changes to the FAR 
periodically to maintain consistency with law and administration policy. 
c. Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons, by J. Ronald 
Fox, 1974 
Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons encompasses the entire 
weapons acquisition process from the initial idea to its operational deployment. The book 
was intended as a follow-on to the two Harvard Business School books by Peck and 
Scherer published some ten years earlier. Fox cites past success in the procurement of 
weapon systems as predicated upon thorough grounding in technology, financial 
management, and military operations. He also calls upon members of Congress for more 
responsible spending practices (Fox, 1974). 
d. The Defense Resources Board, 1979 
The Defense Resources Board of 1979 consisted of high ranking officials, 
including assistant and undersecretary levels, that played a major advisory role to the 
OSD providing overall oversight and supervision of resource allocation of DoD. Its 
Steering Group issued Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) review 
report, which eliminated the restriction of service input limited only to the CJCS. The 
board also functioned to make sure that all the major programs are complying with the 
PPBS and provide a solution to the problems when necessary. However, due to the lack 
in statutory authority, the board can only provide recommendations and had no authority 
unless specifically approved by the deputy SECDEF (Fox, 2011, p. 105). 
e. The DoD Resources Management Study, 1979  
The DoD Resources Management Study (DRMS) of 1979 examined the 
relationship of the systems acquisition process to the resource allocation process of 
PPBS. The DRMS was prepared by the SECDEF in response to the request from the 
President. The DRMS reviewed the defense resource allocation process and four specific  
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functions; weapon system acquisition, logistic support, enlisted personnel management 
and military health which resources involve directly to the defense capabilities (Rice, 
1979, p. vii).  
D. 1981–1990: FP PERIOD, THE REAGAN BUILDUP PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
The U.S. defense budget rapidly increased in response to deal with rise of 
Soviet Union, as they continued to boost its armed forces. DoD TBA averaged $528 
billion (FY2011 Constant Dollars) during this period, 31 percent more than the previous 
Post McNamara Period (National Defense Budget Estimate, 2011). As the U.S. defense 
budget deficits grew, many defense acquisition reforms were initiated and ran throughout 
the 1980s (Butrica, 2001).  
In 1981, The Carlucci 32 Acquisition Initiatives was issued to promote 
effectiveness and efficiency of Acquisition processes. The Carlucci 32 Acquisition 
Initiatives was followed by the Packard Commission, which added legislative oversight 
to the Acquisition process. (Butrica, 2001) In 1984, Competition in Contracting Act 
(CICA) was issued to promote full and open competition in all federal acquisition 
programs. 
b. Industry Environment 
In the 1980s, two technologies were introduced by industry:  the personal 
computer and the space shuttle (Butrica, 2001, p. 199). These breakthrough technologies 
would influence advances in major weapon systems.  
In his paper The U.S. Defense Industrial Base; Past, Present and Future, 
Watts (2008), describes the defense industry during this timeframe well: 
The 1980s began with major increases in defense spending by the Reagan 
administration. By 1985, more than two million industry jobs were added. 
However, several events then sparked a major change in the industrial 
base. First, defense spending began declining in 1985, reducing the overall 
revenues of companies. This decline was to continue unbroken until 1998, 
 33
long enough to overcome any initial beliefs that the downward trend 
would reverse after a few years. Second, the government instituted policy 
and legal changes that altered the ability of companies to makes profits 
even as their sales declined. These changes included cuts in progress 
payments, changes in tax laws, and demands that companies fund 
investments that the government had previously funded. While periodic 
declines in DoD spending were an understandable cyclical aspect of being 
in the defense industry, these other actions aggravated the decline by 
affecting how the companies managed their internal operations in order to 
maintain profitability. They also highlighted the government customer’s 
monopolistic power over companies. Third, parts of the DoD—in 
violation of the Defense Department’s own policies—placed more and 
more of the risks of developing and producing systems on contractors, 
while still reserving the right to change requirements or alter production 
quantities. (p. 24) 
2. Fixed Price  
In the early 1980s, the Packard’s directive, favoring CR contract for development 
program, was overridden by the Secretary of Navy promoting use of FP contract for large 
development weapon system programs (Fox, 2001, p. 24). As a result, FP contracts were 
widely used for USN shipbuilding. As the shipbuilding industry faced greater 
competitions with declining commercial market, many shipbuilders focused on getting 
contracts from the military and often had to bid low or below cost to capture the scarce 
USN contracts. The low bid from the shipbuilder contributed initial cost saving for USN, 
however; in the long run, it resulted in cost overrun, above the target cost, on 19 of the 22 
USN contracts (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 692).  
The preference of FP contract on development programs in the 1980s once again 
resulted in great financial losses for both DoD and industry and caused the schedule delay 
in weapon systems that DoD needed (Fox, 2001, p. 24). In response to mitigate the cost 
overrun on FP contracts, Congress, in 1987, expressed restricting the use of FP contracts 
for large development program in its continuing appropriations legislation (Sacilotto, 
2011, p. 685). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989 further 
restricts DoD from using FP contract for development programs.  
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3. Significant Case: A-12 Avenger II 
The A-12 contract, awarded in 1988, is one of the most noteworthy contracts of 
the 1980s. The A-12 was a full scale Engineering and Development (E&D) FPIF contract 
with 40/60 ratio. The total target price was approximately $4.38 billion with $4.77 billion 
of ceiling price (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 694).  
Due to the complex specifications required by USN, the A-12 program 
experienced serious engineering problems and cost overruns exceeding $2 billion that led 
to delays in schedule. As poor performance, not meeting specification, and schedule 
delays continued, the USN issued a cure notice to the contractor in December 1990. The 
contractor, Lockheed, failed to correct the problems and refused to continue the contract 
unless DoD provided additional funding. As a result, in January 1991, DoD issued a 
termination for default to the contractor for cost overruns over $2 billion and for failure 
to deliver or make progress. In June 1991, the contractor challenged the USN’s decision 
to terminate for default based on the unreasonable and unenforceable schedule requested 
by USN. Lockheed claimed the A-12 production schedule was commercially impossible 
to perform, while the USN failed to disclose superior knowledge on the aircraft 
(Sacilotto, 2011, p. 695). The A-12 program still remains with ongoing litigation to this 
day and maintains the distinction as the largest contract termination in DoD history.  
4. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
a. The Carlucci 32 Acquisition Initiatives, 1981  
In 1981, Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary, implemented 32 initiatives to 
improve cost efficiencies and removed wasteful steps to streamline the acquisition 
process. Carlucci believed that too much regulations and oversights ruined the efficiency 
in acquisition and urged the services to prevent further fraud, waste and mismanagement 
in contracting (Hinnant, 1993, p. 5). However, the services’ efforts to implement 
Carlucci’s initiatives were not successful. His initiatives did not last long due to a lack of 
support from the Congress. Although DoD implemented the initiatives, there was no 
definite driving power behind them (Hinnant, 1993, p. 5).  
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b. Special Panel on Defense Procurement, 1982 
In CRS Report, R41293, Schwartz (2010) states: 
In 1981, Representative Dave McCurdy, then chair of the House Armed 
Services Committee Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures, 
held a series of hearings examining weapon system cost growth. 
According to Representative McCurdy, the intent of the panel was to 
identify and recommend a method which will allow the Congress to more 
effectively review and evaluate cost categories for major weapons 
systems. Subsequently, Senator Nunn and Representative McCurdy led an 
effort to permanently enact the reporting requirements established in the 
FY 1982 Defense Authorization Act. In the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1983 (96 Stat. 718), Congress passed a modified 
version of the FY 1982 reporting requirements. On September 8, 1982, 
President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1983 (P.L. 97-252), which included what has come 
to be known as the Nunn-McCurdy Act. (p.22) 
c. The Defense Industry, by Jacques S. Gansler, 1982  
In his book, The Defense Industry, Gansler investigates the total U.S. 
defense industry with a focus on the post-Vietnam era. He finds that the United States 
government does not recognize the defense industry as valuable national resource and 
proposes seven primary solutions:    
 Coordination of government policies, sector by sector.  
 Integration of civilian and military operations.  
 Recognition of the dual economy.  
 Policies to address international interdependence.  
 Improved planning for productions surge. 
 Cost as a major design and acquisition criterion.  
 Institutionalization of industrial-base considerations (Gansler, 1982, pp. 
261–279). 
d. Grace Commission, 1983 
The Grace Commission of 1983 was a management reform initiated by 
Office of the Counsel to the President, to avoid wasteful public spending. The Grace  
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Commission criticized Congress for the excessively complex regulations and 
micromanaging in DoD major weapons acquisitions program (Gholz et al., 1994).  
e. The Competition in Contracting Act, 1984 
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) imposed competition 
in government contracting. The principle of CICA is to promote competition and increase 
cost savings through the competitive prices provided by competitors. The CICA required 
the contracting officer to obtain full and open competition whenever possible and reduced 
the use of sole-source.  
f. President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 
(Packard Commission), 1986 
The Packard Commission of 1986 is the extension of Grace Commission 
that asked all the Acquisition participants such as government, the services and the 
defense industry to work together to improve business practices. Specific guidance to 
achieve this harmony was not addressed (Gholz et al., 1994). In 1989, SECDEF Cheney 
reported that implementation of Packard Commission’s recommendation within DoD was 
found to be ineffective, as the implementation was not moving fast enough (et al., 1994). 
g. The Defense Management Challenge, by J. R. Fox, 1988  
Fox examines why Defense Acquisition is so resistant to change. He 
addressed what actually happens when the government assumes the job of managing 
large, highly technical programs under contract with industry. Fox found that of the 
people directly involved in the Defense Acquisition process, those with the most widely 
differing perceptions of the current conditions of the process are government and industry 
managers (Fox, 1988, p. 303). Another fundamental issue in the management of defense 
programs, Fox found, was the need for greater funding stability and more effective long-
range defense planning (Fox, 1988, p. 304). Fox believed the organizational changes 




Acquisition. Additionally, he concluded that the Program Management concept should be 
reexamined and that the acquisition workforce needed to be further developed (Fox, 
1988). 
h. Affording Defense, by Jacques S. Gansler, 1989  
Affording Defense focuses on the high cost of national security and the 
challenges of meeting that goal while practicing prudent fiscal management. Gansler 
states, “There is a large gap between America’s actual national-security capability and 
the posture statements and assertions of American policymakers” (Gansler, 1989, p. 2). 
Solutions include weapons-acquisition reform, industry revitalization, and budget areas 
for potential savings. Gansler identifies potential annual savings of $50 billion, saying, 
“The dollars saved must be used to strengthen the United States’ capability to contain 
regional conflicts and to give the United States a more balanced conventional-warfare 
capability in Central Europe, so that we would not have to use nuclear weapons in a 
conflict there” (Gansler, 1989, p. 345). 
i. New Weapons, Old Politics, by Thomas L. McNaugher, 1989   
McNaugher examined how bureaucracies and political structure hampered 
defense procurement. McNaugher highlighted how the needs of American politics, more 
than the needs of technology, have come to shape the strategies for developing arcane 
and uncertain technologies. McNaugher called for changes that ran against the current 
fashion and showed how the United States tried to buy R&D cheaply, and how costly this 
cheap approach has become (McNaugher, 1989). 
j. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 
1990 
DAWIA required DoD to established education programs and standards 
for the defense acquisition workforce (Cooper, 2002, p. 12). 
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E. 1991–2008: CR PERIOD, THE POST COLD WAR PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
With the end of the Cold War and Gulf War, U.S. political leadership 
turned their eyes to domestic issues and, in turn, a reduction in defense spending 
(Shiman, 2001). The size of the Armed forces declined and experienced budget reduction 
within DoD (Shiman, 2001). Between 1991–2008, DoD TBA declined by 7 percent from 
the previous period, though R&D spending expanded as a percentage of TBA from the 
previous period by 2.2 percent (National Defense Budget Estimate, 2011). DoD wanted 
new technologies for new enemies while spending less. As was apparent during the 
previous CR period (The Post McNamara Period), National Security objectives did not 
appear to align with the reality of a reduced defense budget.  
In addition to the acquisition reform of the mid-1980s, acquisition reform 
accelerated in the 1990s as responsible reformers and dedicated their time to continue the 
reform efforts in the DoD—services were also asked to align with these reform efforts 
(Shiman, 2001). New regulations were promulgated to better train the acquisition 
workforce and to promote better acquisition practices. Most of the reform efforts in the 
1990s and 2000s were focused on managerial efficiencies due to the lack in general 
resources (Shiman, 2001). 
b. Industry Environment 
SECDEF Aspen’s meeting in 1993, commonly referred to as the “Last 
Supper,” with industry executives created major consolidation and shrinkage within the 
U.S. defense industry. This consolidation resulted in the emerging of the “Big Five” of 
U.S. defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General 
Dynamics, and Raytheon (Watts, 2008, p. 31). 
In the early 2000s, defense contracting fundamentally shifted, contracted 
services emerged as a more prominent force within the defense industry. In his book, 
Democracy’s Arsenal, Jacques S. Gansler (2011) writes: 
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…the overall Department of Defense procurements shifted to 60 percent 
services. In just three years, the number of service-contract actions grew 
from about 325,000 in 2001 to over 600,000 by 2004, and over the same 
time periods, the number of federal professional service contractors grew 
from 45,000 to 83,000….  
…there are two major causes for shifts in the workforce mix: (1) services 
have become a majority of the functions being performed in the defense 
industry, and (2) blue collar manufacturing jobs has decreased 
significantly as the high cost of weapons systems and their increasing 
complexities have resulted in far fewer of them, both in types and in 
quantity. (pp. 46, 235–236) 
2. Cost Reimbursement 
In March 1991, Eleanor Spector, Director of Defense Procurement within the 
DoD, restricted use of FP R&D contracting due to the negative consequences of the 
inappropriate use of FP. (Sacilotto, 2011, pp. 696–697) In her article, “Déjà vu All over 
Again: Cost-Reimbursement Contracts Fall out of Favor Again, But Should They?” Kara 
Sacilotto (2011) states:    
By the mid-2000s, however, these consequences were no longer on 
Congress's radar. In 2006, in the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (FY 2007 NDAA), Congress 
repealed the ban on fixed-price developmental contracts it had put in place 
through its FY 1989 NDAA. In addition to lifting the ban, section 818 of 
the 1989 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to adopt revised 
regulations for selecting contract type for major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs). (pp. 696–697) 
3. Significant Case: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the most expensive and 
ambitious aircraft acquisition within the DoD today. JSF used CR type contracts through 
development and production. Lockheed Martin is responsible for the entire JSF program 
with support from the Pratt and Whitney for its engine manufacturing. JSF adopted a 
“single step” acquisition strategy to develop full-combat capabilities. Its development 
schedule was very aggressive and its development risk was considerably high (GAO, 
2010a, p. 3).  
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The JSF program faced its major challenges with cost overrun. A GAO report 
(GAO-10-382) states that JSF suffered from both cost overrun and schedule delays. The 
estimated acquisition costs were increased $46 billion from the baseline approved in 2007 
and the development schedule was extended two more years. As a result, the JSF 
program is at risk of not meeting the quantities and capabilities as planned. As of March 
2010, the unit costs of JSF exceeded established cost thresholds and violated the Nunn-
McCurdy provision which required DoD’s explanation to Congress. (Clark, 2010) Due to 
the continuous manufacturing problems, in 2009, only four out of 13 test aircraft was 
delivered and only 10 percent of the planned sorties were completed for the flight test 
program. Based on JSF’s manufacturing inefficiencies, lack the maturity and engineering 
technical changes, the independent manufacturing review team concluded that the 
planned production rate was unachievable.  
As DoD continues to invest more funds to maintain the JSF program, the risk is 
now at DoD by the nature of CR contracts with low production rate. GAO report (2010a) 
recommended DoD to submit plans to mitigate the risks of using CR procurement and 
suggest converting the CR type contract to FP contract as JSF program are beyond the 
R&D phase. 
4. Acquisition Reform Initiatives   
a. Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws 
Pursuant to Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1991 
The Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws was 
created in response to Section 800 of the National Defense Authorization Act, and its 
report entitled to improve government’s rights on commercial technologies and reducing 
administrative overhead. 
In his paper, The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present and Future, 
Reeves (1996) states:  
Section 800 of the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act 
directed the DoD to establish the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel. Taking 
its cue from the Packard Commission, this panel was directed to “review 
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all acquisition laws applicable to the DoD and make recommendations for 
repeal or amendments of laws unnecessary to the buyer-seller 
relationship.”  After reviewing some 600 laws, the panel issued a 1,800 
page report detailing specific changes or elimination of each law 
reviewed. Key recommendations included simplifying acquisition 
procedures for procurements under $100,000, new definitions allowing the 
DoD to act as a commercial purchaser, new thresholds on socio-economic 
programs, and eliminating TINA requirements for procurements under 
$500,000. (p.22)  
b. National Performance Review (NPR), 1993  
National Performance Review of 1993 focused on efficiency that makes 
government to work better and cost less. Vice President Gore submitted the report From 
Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less on 7 
September 1993. His report provided 384 recommendations including acquisition reform 
and other measures for anticipated savings of $108 billion (Gordon, 1994). 
c. Defense Science Board (DSB) Defense Acquisition Reform Study 
(Phase I), 1993   
Phase I of the Defense Acquisition Reform Studies identified “the need to 
replace the current practices of conducting the acquisition of DoD’s products and services 
with world class or best of class commercial practices.” (DSB, 1996) The most important 
aspect is the integration of defense and commercial industrial base. The fully integrated 
commercial industries with R&D and production resources to the DoD will promote 
economic growth and industrial competitiveness and improve the U.S. economy overall. 
The report firmly acknowledged the need to adopt commercial practices as a way of 
doing business and developed a set of reform initiatives designed to accelerate the 
required changes (DSB, 1993, p. i).  
d. Defense Science Board (DSB) Defense Acquisition Reform Study 
(Phase II), 1994  
Phase II of the Defense Acquisition Reform Studies further defined the 
required actions to achieve efficiency in Defense Acquisition reform in Phase I by 
identifying the obstacles to adopting commercial practices. (DSB, 1994) The report 
identified “specific industry segments for commercialization, identified specific 
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combatant commands for increased responsibility in the requirements process, and 
further defined the barriers to the adoption of commercial practices within DoD 
acquisition” (DSB, 1996). Finally, the board believes that it is possible to achieve 
increased commercial practices without sacrificing the public trust in spending taxpayer’s 
dollars (DSB, 1994). 
e. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
The 1994 FASA affected many areas of the acquisition process. The 
FASA eliminated many restrictions, acquisition laws and regulations that used to impede 
the streamlining the procurement process. FASA emphasized use of commercial items 
and practices. Use of commercial item to the maximum extent practicable reduces costs 
and attracts nontraditional companies, those companies reluctant to do business with 
government due to complex business requirements required by government, to 
government contracting. FASA provided acquisition workforce personnel with 
streamlined procurement processes with the establishment of Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures (SAP). Lastly, the requirements for Cost and Pricing Data were exempted for 
the commercial item procurement.  
f. Defense Conversion, by Jacques S. Gansler, 1996  
In this book, Jacques Gansler (1996) addresses restructuring the defense 
industry after the end of the Cold War by integrating civilian and military operations. He 
recommended sixteen specific government actions that could achieve civilian and 
military integration. The sixteen recommendations are: 
 Establish a clear vision statement and a strategy. 
 Achieve some early successes. 
 Expand the definition of commercial specifically to encompass 
commercial facilities. 
 Make a weapon’s price a part of the military-acquisition requirement. 
 Recognize that each sector of the defense industrial base is dramatically 
different. 
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 Establish a true preference for commercial specifications and standards in 
all DoD designs and manufacturing operations. 
 Prohibit passing down defense-unique rules to lower-tier suppliers. 
 Implement significant changes in the DoD’s R&D practices. 
 Require contractor support of logistic activities as the norm. 
 Dramatically reduce defense industry overhead. 
 Create incentives for firms to move to integrated facilities. 
 Revise many of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission 
antitrust rules if the downsizing process is to be rational. 
 Give consideration to the special financial problems associated with the 
capital investment situation in the defense industrial base. 
 Implement widespread shift from today’s lengthy and cumbersome. 
 Government contract award process to a modern, electronic-data-
exchange. 
 Procurement system. 
 Implement a government-civilian manpower reduction plan. 
 Have explicit institutional mechanisms to monitor the progress of the 
cultural transformation (p. 232). 
g. Defense Science Board (DSB) Defense Acquisition Reform Study 
(Phase III), 1996  
Phase III of the DSB Defense Acquisition Reform Studies concentrated on 
examining the feasibility of extending “best-of-class practices to the R&D phase of a 
system’s acquisition.” Researchers concluded that the current acquisition process should 
be replaced, and that the R&D phase of military systems should adopt best commercial 
practices. The Task Force recommended that “The DoD acquisition system must provide 
a continual competitive environment whereby military hardware and software are 
developed and procured using world-class processes” (DSB, 1996).  
h. Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 made further advances on initiatives 
implemented under FASA. Some of the most important changes amended the Simplified  
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Acquisition Procedure (SAP) and commercial items procedures, permitted efficient 
competitive range determination, and changed Information Technology Acquisition 
Processes. 
The Clinger-Cohen Act broadened the definition of commercial items and 
eliminated certain certifications required by law. The legislation also initiated an 
examination of procurement laws and regulations potentially inconsistent with acquiring 
commercial products. It also exempted COTS items from Cost-Accounting Standards 
(CAS) and from the submission of cost and pricing data required under TINA. 
i. Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform, RAND Corp., 2005 
In 2005, the RAND Corporation published this study that examined 
acquisition reform and acquisition excellence initiatives undertaken in the DoD over the 
period 1990 to 2003. In the DoD, 63 distinct acquisition reform initiatives were 
undertaken from 1989 to 2002. By looking at what the acquisition reform movement was 
in the 1990s, and by letting acquisition personnel describe in their own words how their 
work was affected by those initiatives, this significant acquisition reform seeks to shed 
light on what the acquisition reform movement has and has not accomplished in terms of 
changing the way the acquisition process works (Fox, 2011, p. 181).  
Unlike Acquisition Reform initiatives in 1980s, which was to reduce 
waste, fraud and abuse in defense contracting, the major focus of Acquisition Reform 
initiatives during the 1990s was to find the ways to streamline the acquisition process. 
This study also examined to identify which Acquisition Reform initiatives have been 
incorporated into the curriculum of the Defense Acquisition University (Hanks, 
Axelband, Lindsay, Malik & Steele, 2005, pp. 3–4).    
j. Comparative History of DoD Management Reform, NPS, 2006  
This study analyzes the history of management reform within the DoD 
from 1947 to 2006 based on the annual reports of the SECDEF to Congress. 
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k. OSD Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA), 
2006  
The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment initiative was 
established by Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England in a 7 June 2005 
memo. He directed “an integrated acquisition assessment to consider every aspect of 
acquisition, including requirements, organizational, legal foundations like Goldwater-
Nichols, decision methodology, oversight, checks and balances every aspect.” (Spring, 
2005, p. 1) In the end, the DAPA Panel proposed t h e  w a y  t o  improve the DoD’s 
ability and integrate key elements of the acquisition system, such as acquisition 
workforces, requirements, budgets and industry (DoD DAPA, 2006).  
l. John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 
In 2006, in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2007, Congress lifted the ban on FP developmental contracts and required SECDEF 
to implement revised acquisition process in selecting contract type for major weapon 
systems revised regulations (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 697).  
m. Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
Expeditionary Operations, 2007  
In this study, researchers reviewed recent operations and provided 
forward-looking recommendations to ensure that future military operations achieved 
greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. 
n. Defense Acquisition: Options for Congress, CRS, by Stephen 
Chadwick, 2007 
In this report, Chadwick provided an outline of the DoD’s defense 
acquisition structure and discussed the most recent major reports addressing defense 
acquisition and the DoD’s defense acquisition transformation efforts. Chadwick also 
included a description of some significant issues for the 110th Congress to consider, as 
well as some recommendations for addressing those issues. 
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F. 2009–PRESENT: FP PERIOD, THE PRESENT PERIOD 
1. Background 
a. Defense Environment 
In 2009, with numerous GAO reporting on criticism of cost growth on 
major weapon systems, President Obama issued a Presidential Memorandum on 
government contracting to find efficiency and preferable contracting type. The President 
noted the dollars obligated on CR contracts were doubled from FY 2000 to FY 2008 
(Sacilotto, 2011, p. 700). According to the President’s memorandum, avoiding sole-
source and CR contracts to the maximum extent can save billions of dollars each year. In 
order to save taxpayer’s dollars, the President issued the orders to the director of the 
OMB to eliminate possible wasteful and inefficient contracts and cancel them if 
necessary. The memorandum favors FP contracts and limits the CR contracts to the 
minimum possible (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 701). 
DoD TBA since 2009 has averaged $704 billion, comparable to the 
preceding two years. However, the TBA for the previous period averaged 43 percent less 
on average and 13 percent less than the average TBA the previous period following 9/11 
(National Defense Budget Estimate, 2011).  
b. Industry Environment 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, GDP fell 2.5 percent in 2009, 
though expanded by 4.2 percent the following year (BEA, 2011). Such an economic 
contraction, along with drawdown to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, indicate a short-term 
future that may be challenging for the defense industry. 
2. Fixed Price  
To meet the President’s directives, OMB issued “Memorandum for the Heads of 
Departments and Agencies.” The goal of this memorandum was to improve government 
acquisition, to perform a review on all existing contracts and acquisition practices, and to 
save 7 percent of baseline contract spending by the end of FY 2011 (Sacilotto, 2011, 
p. 701). In return, OFPP came up with guidelines in October 2009 stating FP contracts 
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are the preferred method, and if managed right, FP contracts can provide better incentive 
than CR contracts for the contractor to control cost and performance (Sacilotto, 2011, 
p. 702). Furthermore, the OFPP advised all government agencies to find the opportunities 
to convert from CR contracts to FP contracts where possible.  
On September 14, 2010, Dr. Ashton Carter, USD (AT&L), issued guidance to 
DoD acquisition professionals to improve efficiency and control cost growth on all DoD 
acquisition programs. One of his main guidance to the DoD was the use of FPIF contracts 
with 50/50 share ratio between contractors and government and a 120 percent ceiling 
price limit (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 704).  
Over the last two decades, the contract type preferred by government has come 
full circle from limiting the use of FP contracts for major weapon system acquisition to 
favoring FP contracts requiring a written justification, if FP contract is not selected 
(Sacilotto, 2011, p. 700).  
3. Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
a. National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110–181), 
2008  
This act included a provision on future contracts for the use of new Lead 
System Integrators for major systems. 
b. DoD Instruction 5000.2, 2008  
This report included updated instruction, including a mandatory 
requirement for competitive prototyping, more emphasis on systems engineering and 
technical reviews, and a requirement that all programs go through an MDD process prior 
to entering the acquisition system. 
c. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (CJCSI 
3170.01G), 2009  
In this report, researchers streamlined the requirement-validation process 
and expanded the role of the Joint Capabilities Board. They also recommended that 
combatant commanders be more involved in establishing requirements. 
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d. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009  
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), passed in May 
2009, was an important step to address many of the existing problems in defense 
acquisition process and requirements development. The WSARA emphasized getting 
things right from the beginning with identifying realistic requirements, accurate cost 
estimation, and promote competition in major weapon systems (Sacilotto, 2011, p. 709). 
The WSARA consists of changes on organization, acquisition policy and congressional 
reporting requirements and provides guidance how these three major objectives can be 
achieved.  
e. DSB:  Creating a DoD Strategic Acquisition Platform, 2009  
This report provides recommendations to the SECDEF based on previous 
reports from the DSB. The reports states, “Today, the defense acquisition process takes 
too long to produce weapons that are too expensive and often technically outdated by the 
time they are field” (DSB, 2009, p. 1). 
The DSB (2009) report summarizes the key elements of a strategic 
acquisition platform as follows: 
 Buy the right things, guided by national security objectives. 
 Select an effective leadership team—in the office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the military departments, and defense agencies—with proven, 
relevant experience. Ensure alignment among senior leadership to DoD 
goals and timely support of major acquisition decisions. 
 Reform acquisition with efficient processes for major systems, 
information technology systems, and to rapidly field critical war fighting 
needs, especially in times of crisis. 
 Improve acquisition execution–management of product development, 
contract award and management with credible contractor teams and 
contracts, right sizing and training the acquisition workforce, acquisition 
integrity, and acquisition performance metrics. 
 Enlist Congress as part of the solution to provide the legislative support 
needed to succeed (p. 39). 
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f. CNA Independent Assessment: Air Force Acquisition, 2009 
The CNA report on Air Force Acquisition was prepared by the retired high 
rank military and civilian official with substantial experience in managing acquisition 
program. From the mid-1990s, the AF has experienced the cost overrun, schedule delay 
and performance problems with its acquisition system and processes (Christle, Davis & 
Porter, 2009, p. 3). This report was consisting of two broad categories with six topic 
areas. The major findings from this report were the failure of the USAF community to 
treat defense acquisition as a profession in the USAF and failure of AF leadership to 
enforce acquisition policies, procedures and hold subordinates accountable (Christle et 
al., 2009, pp. 5–6).  
g. Implementing Management for Performance and Related 
Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition (IMPROVE) 
Acquisition Act of 2010 
The IMPROVE Acquisition Act was intended to reform the remaining 80 
percent of the defense acquisition system that was not addressed by the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act. 
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Most analysis of contract type for major weapons systems has been addressed 
across historically short periods of time. The analysis approach of this paper covers sixty-
three years and is based on the assumption that a larger the sample size will yield more 
meaningful data.  
Defense Acquisition is a complex process that has evolved as the DoD’s 
requirements and environment have changed. Analysis of long-term trends may lead 
researchers to conclusions across the entire time scale. Researchers may also find a 
meaningful point in time from which to base further research. 
B. CONTRACT TYPE TRENDS 
Figure 7 reflects trends in predominant contract type across DoD total budget 
authority2 (TBA) years since 1947. Firstly, use of FP contracting appears to coincide with 
larger defense budgets. Secondly, entrance and exit point to FP period coincide closely to 
increases and decreases in DoD TBA. Thirdly, during the years 1950–1952 the DoD 
TBA fluctuates wildly. 
                                                 
2 Starting in 2001, DoD TBA also begins including supplemental funding for the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). Some of this money has gone into RDT&E and procurement, but it is difficult to depict 
how much is in relation to the traditional appropriations categories (RDT&E, procurement, military 
personnel, etc. (Watts, 2008, p. 11). 
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Figure 7.   DoD TBA by Contract Type Period (Millions of Constant FY 2011 Dollars). 
(From National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2012) 
The average defense budget for FP periods over time has been $545B (constant 
FY 2011 dollars), while the average defense budget for CR periods over time has been 
$431B (constant FY 2011 dollars). Thus, FP periods average 26 percent greater DoD 
TBA than during CR periods.  
Since 1947, 30 of the 64 years have seen a declining defense budget. Consider the 
three years before each contract type period and the first three years within that contract 
type period. The three FP periods initially show budget growth of 22 percent, 25 percent, 
and a most recent decline of 6 percent. The two CR periods initially show declines of 
18 percent and 16 percent. The first three years of a FP period have seen increases in 
DoD TBA averaging 13.9 percent, vice 9.8 percent growth in the prior three year period. 
The first three years of the most recent FP period, beginning in 2009, was the first time a 
FP period began with a declining defense budget at -5.6 percent. 
The three years, from 1950–1952, encompass the Korean War years. A shift in 
preference for a certain contract type likely did not occur due to the brevity of the conflict 




spectrum does the defense budget fluctuate so violently. FP periods correlate closely to 
higher DoD TBA with the most recent FP period occurring some six years later than the 
two previous FP periods. 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
1. Budget Category 
Figure 8 reflects three defense budget categories relevant to the Acquisition of 
major weapon systems as a percentage of DoD TBA. The three budget categories are 
R&D, procurement, and operations and maintenance (O&M). Firstly, procurement funds 
as a percentage of DoD TBA has varied cyclically across time, while O&M and R&D 
funding have more gradually increased as a percentage of DoD TBA. Secondly, the years 




Figure 8.   Relevant Budget Categories as a Percentage of DoD TBA. (From National 
Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2012) 
 .  
FP Period FP Period FP Period 
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On average, procurement funding has been greater as a percentage of DoD TBA 
for FP periods, 24 percent, vice 20 percent during CR periods.  
Procurement funding appears to increase considerably preceding each FP. From 
start to finish every CR period has experienced an increase in procurement funding by an 
average increase of 3 percent of TBA. Inversely, every complete FP period (not including 
the current FP period) has experienced a decrease in procurement funding by an average 
decrease of 6 percent of TBA. Troughs occur shortly before the mid-point in each CR 
period, while procurement funding has peaked within 2 (2007), 3 (1962), and 4 (1984) 
years of a new FP period. 
Both greater DoD TBA and procurement funding occur more regularly during FP 
periods. More notably, an expanding procurement budget has acted as a leading indicator 
of a new FP period. 
2. Major U.S. Military Conflicts 
Consider the requirements placed on the DoD. Figure 9 shows major combat 
operations since 1947.  
 
 
Figure 9.   DoD TBA & Major U.S. Military Conflicts (Billions of Constant FY 2011 
Dollars). (From U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, 
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011, Table 3.1) 
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DoD TBA has grown on average 53 percent from the year prior to major combat 
operations to the average DoD TBA during the ensuing operation. The average DoD 
TBA for times of combat operations is $506B, vice $417B during times of peace.  
Following major combat operations DoD TBA has fallen 16 percent from the average of 
the preceding operation. Understandably, TBA increases significantly during periods of 
war. 
There appears to be little correlation between the contract type period and war 
years with 51 percent of CR years occurring during a time of war and 49 percent of FP 
years occurring during a time of war. FP contracts average annual DoD TBA of $545B, 
vice $506B for years of major combat operations.  
On average, DoD TBA is greater during FP periods than during periods of major 
combat operations. FP periods have consistently corresponded with years of greatest DoD 
TBA, irrespective of major combat operations. 
D. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY   
1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Figure 10 shows U.S. GDP growth annualized as a percentage across contract 
type periods. During CR periods GDP has grown at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent, 
while FP periods grew at an average annual rate of 7.0 percent. During CR years GDP 
growth was above the overall 6.8 percent average 63 percent of the time. During FP years 
GDP growth was above average 59 percent of the time. GDP rate of growth reflects 
negligibly to either contract type period since one is slightly better on average and the 
other reflective of slightly more sustained GDP growth. 
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Figure 10.   GDP percent Growth by Contract Type Period. (From U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis  
From Q1 2009 to Q1 2012 GDP growth rate averages 3.0 percent annualized. 
Since Q1 2008 that rate is 1.8 percent annualized, much less than the 6.8 percent average 
GDP growth rate since 1947. 
In order to illustrate the relation of contract type to percent GDP growth Figure 11 
uses GDP percent growth using a five year moving average. FP contracting appears to be 
preferred shortly after a period of an expansion or decline in the rate of GDP growth. 
Apparently, policy makers have not consistently used GDP growth as a factor for 
preferring one contract type over another.  
 
Figure 11.   GDP percent Growth using 5-yr MA. (From U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
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Possibly, the size of government receipts, related to shifts in GDP growth rate, 
corresponds to contract type periods. Figures 12 and Figure 13 show no discernable 
connection between government receipts and occurrence of contract type periods. Figure 
12 shows government receipts as a percentage of GDP by contract type periods. Figure 
13 shows gross government receipts in constant FY 2005 dollars by contract type period.   
 
Figure 12.   Receipts as a Percentage of GDP. (From Office of Management and Budget, 
Historical Tables 
 
Figure 13.   Federal Receipts (Billions of Contant FY 2005 Dollars). (From Office of 
Management and Budget, Historical Tables 
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DoD TBA and procurement funding as a percentage of DoD TBA appear to be 
better indicators of a shift in contract type than do macroeconomic measures such as GDP 
growth or federal receipts. Economic factors controller by the government appear to be  
better indicators of shifts in contract type periods. A lack of correlation between contract 
type periods and macroeconomic factors indicates that these factors are poor indicators of 
the entrance or exit trigger points to FP or CR period. 
2. Defense Industy Periods 
Figure 14 shows GDP percent change across Watts’ Defense Industry periods. 
Each of these three periods appears to reflect a correlation in relative movement between 
GDP percent growth and defined periods during which the defense industry changed. The 
“Growth” period experienced volatile GDP growth. The “Mature” period experienced 
sustained high GDP growth that returned to an average rate. The Restructuring period 
experienced stable GDP growth slightly below the 6.8 percent average since 1947.  
 
Figure 14.   GDP percent Change across Watts’ Defense Industry Periods. (From  U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Figure 15 alternately shows how Watts’ Defense Industry periods vary by 
volatility of GDP. The smaller area of the most recent Restructuring Period reflects less 













The "Growth" Period 9.8 15.5 -0.7 3.9 
The "Mature" Period 3.5 12.1 3.5 5.8 
The Restructuring Period 3.3 6.5 3.3 4.9 
 
Figure 15.   Variations in GDP Growth During Watts’ Defense Industry Periods.  
(From U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Average GDP growth has progressed by industry period from 6.4 percent to 
8.4 percent to 5.4 percent, while the DoD TBA has progressed by industry period from 
$376B to $466B to $480B, see Figure 16. Apparently, the amount of defense spending 
and the stability of the U.S. economy had more to do with forming the current defense 
industry than average GDP growth has. The defense industry surely is insulated against 




Figure 16.   DoD TBA across Watts’ Defense Industry periods (Millions of Constant FY 
2011 Dollars). (From (National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2012) 
Figure 16, DoD TBA across Watts’ Defense Industry periods, is used to analyze 
shifts within the defense industry relative to shifts in contract type period. Transition 
points between contract type and Defense Industry periods match for 1991. In 1991, a CR 
period was beginning as was the Restructuring period for the Defense Industry. Secondly, 
the “Mature” period begins in 1961, four years before a FP period begins in 1965.  
Of the four major conflicts since 1947, only once did the entrance or exit of the 
conflict correspond to a change in preference for contract type. That period was in 1991 
when the first Gulf War ended. That is, just once in seven opportunities did change in 
contract type period correspond to the entrance or exit of a conflict period. Furthermore, 
if the transition point between contract type periods is expanded by five years before and 
five years in either direction shows no better a correlation between entrance or exit to 
major conflicts and transitions between predominant contract type. In fact, the five years 
of the TPP Period between 1965–1969 restricts showing any less of a correlation.  
The year 1991 appears to indicate a point in time where both the government and 
the defense industry changed. In 1991, a CR period began, procurement funding as a 




Restructuring Period began. Other than in 1991, since the DoD formed in 1947 structural 
changes within the defense industry have not aligned consistently with contract type 
periods. 
E. DEFENSE MARKETPLACE TRENDS 
1. Workforce 
Figure 17 reflects changes to the size of the total defense industry between 1947–
2006. Firstly, the number of “Defense Related Employment in Industry” shadowed the 
number of military until the early 1980s when the size of employment in industry 
outnumbers the size of the military. Since the year 2000, total military and DoD civilians 
have remained relatively stable, while the defense related employment in industry has 
grown by 48 percent. Secondly, the size of “Defense Related Employment in Industry” 
seems to increase relative to DoD TBA. 
Employment in industry averages 20 percent greater during FP periods than 
during CR periods. FP periods have, thus, experienced 20 percent greater employment in 
industry and 26 percent greater DoD TBA than during CR periods. 
 
Figure 17.   Total Defense Marketplace Workforce. (From National Defense Budget 
Estimates for FY 2006) 
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Figure 18 reflects the DoD workforce as a percentage of total federal 
employment. Aside from the drastic increase in workforce during the Korean War years, 
the DoD workforce appears to expand during the two previous FP periods, first in 1966, 
then again in 1981. Since the most recent FP period began in 2009, military and DoD 
civilians have not noticeably increased as a percentage of the size of the total federal 
workforce.  
 
Figure 18.   DoD Workforce  percent Total Federal Workforce. (From National Defense 
Budget Estimates for FY 2012) 
Table 4 shows that on average the size of the military and DoD civilian 
workforces have made up a larger portion of the total federal workforce during periods of 
FP contracting. Military was 4.4 percent greater on average, DoD civilian were 
2.2 percent greater on average. Combined DoD made up a larger portion of the federal 
workforce by 6.5 percent during FP periods. 
Table 4. DoD Workforce Percent Total Federal Workforce. (Authors) 
 
Cost 
Reimbursement Fixed Price Delta(FP) 
Military 46.6% 51.0% 4.4% 
DoD Civilian 21.9% 24.1% 2.2% 
Total DoD% 
Federal 68.6% 75.1% 6.5% 
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The total combined defense marketplace workforce (total military, DoD civilian, 
and defense related employment in industry) averages 18 percent greater during FP 
periods than during CR periods: 6,564 to 5,571. See Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   Combined Defense Marketplace Workforce. (From National Defense Budget 
Estimates for FY 2006) 
FP periods have historically experienced greater DoD TBA by 26 percent and a 
larger defense marketplace workforce by 18 percent, been defined by entrance and exit 
points that correspond to increases and decreases in DoD TBA (with the most recent FP 
period occurring some six years later than would have been expected), and been preceded 
by procurement funds increasing as a percentage of DoD TBA.  
FP periods have shown little relation to periods of major military conflicts, 
changes in GDP growth or federal receipts, and periods of structural change within the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Is the most recent preference, beginning in 2009, for fixed price contracting 
historically consistent with prior trends? 
The most recent preference for FP contracting is mostly inconsistent with prior 
trends; use of historic indicators of FP periods would have predicted an earlier start to the 
current FP period. Four data points suggest the timing for the most recent FP period is 
inconsistent with previous FP periods.  
 FP periods historically coincide with defense budgets that are 26 percent 
larger than during CR periods.  Considering the current drawdown to 
major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan DoD TBA would be 
expected to drop by around 16 percent based on the funding level changes 
following previous major combat operations. Higher DoD TBA correlates 
even closer to FP periods, 26 percent, than to periods of major combat 
operations, 17 percent.  
 The previous two FP periods began at the start of large increases of TBA 
and ended after TBA peaked (see Figure 7). The current FP period began 
near the peak of an expanding DoD TBA cycle. Historical trends for DoD 
TBA would have predicted a FP period beginning around 2002. 
 Fifty-nine years of data suggests that a larger size of the defense 
marketplace workforce correlates closely to periods of FP contracting and 
a greater DoD TBA.  The defense industry workforce has been 20 percent 
larger during FP periods. However, from 2000–2006, the defense industry 
workforce had already grown by 48 percent before the most recent FP 
period began in 2009. The current higher combined defense marketplace 
workforce corresponds to previous FP periods; however, the current shift 
to the FP preference is several years later than the other FP transitions.  
 The current proportion of procurement funding to DoD TBA resembles a 
budget composition of a CR period. Recently, procurement funds peaked 
at 24 percent in 2007 and have leveled off around 20 percent since. 
Procurement funds during CR periods historically averaged 20 percent of 
DoD TBA. Procurement funds average just over 24 percent of DoD TBA 
for FP periods. 
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One data points suggest that this most current FP period aligns with previous FP 
periods. 
 The gradual increase in procurement funding as a percentage of DoD TBA 
corresponds to similar FP shifts preceding the previous FP periods. 
Expanding procurement funding may be a leading indicator of FP periods. 
Today’s declining defense budget, drawdowns in major combat operations, an 
apparently declining defense industry workforce, and smaller procurement budget run 
counter to the timing when previous FP periods were deemed appropriate. However, a 
gradually increasing procurement budget that preceded the current FP period shows 
similarity between the current and previous FP periods.   
2. Our Secondary Research Questions Include the Following 
What are the historical leading indicators for the Department of Defense’s 
cyclical preference for certain types of contracts? 
The indicator that best predicts change in preference for contract type appears to 
be an extended expansion of the procurement budget as a percentage of DoD TBA 
preceding FP periods. See Figure 8. 
 Is the DoD's fixed-price contract preference responsive to changes 
in total defense budget authority? 
Growth in DoD TBA appears to align closely with shifts in preference towards FP 
contracting. During the previous two FP periods, the three years prior to a shift in 
preference towards FP contracts saw DoD TBA grow by an average of 24 percent 
(22 percent and 25 percent) when compared to the first three years of the FP period. The 
three years, years four thru six preceding the shift to FP contracts, saw DoD TBA grow 
by an average of just 5 percent (5 percent and 5 percent), which indicates that DoD TBA 
has typically begun to rise more the three years before a shift towards FP contracts. See 
Figure 7. 
Contrary to previous trends, since the beginning of the most recent FP period in 
2009 the DoD TBA has declined by 6 percent. However, if the shift in preference 
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towards FP contracting would have happened earlier (2002), then there would have been 
a similar increase in DoD TBA, of 33 percent, to the historical average increase of 
24 percent DoD TBA. 
 Is the DoD's fixed-price contract preference responsive to prevailing 
trends in acquisition reform literature? 
The timing of acquisition reform initiatives does not appear to correlate closely to 
changes in contract type preference; however, cultural trends, based on published 
American literature using the Google Ngram Viewer tool, shows an interrelationship 
between key acquisition terms and contract type preference. 
Usage of contract type in American literature appears to be a leading indicator of 
FP periods (aside from the Clinton administration Defense Acquisition reform initiatives 
in the early 1990s). 
Acquisition policy and culture show less correlation following the initial FP 
period between 1965–1969. The first FP period, or TPP period, coincided with fixed price 
contract appearing in print some 30 percent more than at any point in time since.  
Published debate on FP contracting appears to have peaked during the initial FP period 
forty-five years ago and has leveled off since.   
Cost type contracts are generally discussed in print much less than fixed price 
contract. In fact, use of fixed price contract correlated closely to contract type usage in 
American literature from 1948–2000. Since around 2000, American culture appears to 
have shifted attention away from FP contracts and away from major weapon systems. 
 Is the DoD's fixed-price contract preference responsive to growth or 
decline in the economy? 
FP contracting preference appears to be implemented during initial periods of 
expansion or decline in rate of GDP growth. Since the late 1980s GDP growth rate has 
remained in a consistent range. Thus, the recent change in preference towards FP 




 Is the DoD's fixed-price contract preference responsive to growth or 
decline in the defense industry? 
FP periods correlate closely to periods of higher defense related employment in 
industry (see Figure 17). Since 1947, employment in industry averages 20 percent greater 
during FP periods than during CR periods. Greater employment within the defense 
industry and a larger DoD TBA has aligned closely with the first two FP periods. The 
current FP period was preceded by a 48 percent expansion of the defense industry 
workforce from 2000–2006. The historical trend of employment in industry would have 
predicted a FP period beginning in the early 2000s. 
B. CONCLUSION 
FP contracting shifts risks from the government to the contractor by locking in a 
set price and provides the contractor strong incentive to control costs. FP periods have 
historically followed shortly after an expanding DoD budget has begun. As the defense 
budget has expanded, policy makers have attempted to take measures to prevent waste of 
government funds. Thus, the DoD has appeared to emphasize FP contracting in response 
to pressures to control costs, while prospects were greatest for the defense industry.   
High-profile contracts for major weapon systems that have experienced 
significant cost, schedule, and/or performance issues have repeatedly marred the DoD 
and the defense industry. Public awareness through published literature of contract type 
correlates closely to FP periods, while fixed price contract usage in American literature 
peaks during the same timeframes. Coincidently, the larger defense budgets that have 
historically aligned with FP periods have inadvertently encouraged public scrutiny of 
defense spending practices. An increased public focus on defense contracting, and an 
increased DoD TBA, both appear to influence acquisition policy towards FP contracting.  
Each contract type period appears to end with a public and dramatic case that 
demonstrates some of the negative impacts of a particular contract type. Certain 
conditions tend to be present for a particular contract type period to be established. As the 
lone buyer within the defense industry, the DoD sets market conditions from which 
current and future requirements are met.  
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Factors set by the government, such as DoD TBA and budget composition, reflect 
overwhelmingly how self-imposed conditions have contributed to an acquisition 
environment that cyclically shifts preference for a certain contract type. For example, FP 
periods correlate closer to a larger defense budget than to periods of major combat 
operations or to GDP growth rates.  
FP periods appear predicated mostly upon the following two factors: DoD TBA 
and the expansion of procurement funding as a percent of DoD TBA. FP periods 
historically coincide with defense budgets that are 26 percent larger than during CR 
periods. FP periods typically have defined entry and exit points that correspond to 
increases and decreases in DoD TBA. Preceding all FP periods, procurement funding has 
increased as a percentage of DoD TBA. Procurement funding appears to be the best 
leading indicator for FP periods, though, a declining procurement budget during FP 
periods may yet prove to be as good as, or better, indicator for shifts in preference back to 
CR periods. Just as procurement funding has consistently increased preceding FP periods, 
procurement funding too has consistently declined preceding CR periods.   
Historic contract type preference strongly contradicts FAR guidance. FAR 
16.103(b) states, “A firm-fixed price contract, which best utilizes the basic profit motive 
of business enterprise, shall be used when the risk involved is minimal or can be 
predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty.” FAR 16.301-2 states that cost-
reimbursement contracts are appropriate when “uncertainties involved in contract 
performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type 
of fixed-price contract.” Historically, FP periods have been entered into during periods of 
increasing TBA and have extended into a period when TBA is declining.  Such uncertain 
budgetary environments have historically been followed by a shift in contract type 
preference to CR contracting. These periods of transition when defense spending is 
declining represents a time of uncertainty within the defense industry. Uncertainty during 
such transitional times greatly increases the uncertainty of cost estimates by defense 
contractors. Additionally, indirect costs are the largest category of cost within a cost 
estimate (Sondheimer, 2001). A Defense Contract Management Agency Overhead 
Initiative found that indirect costs composed more than half the value of total work in 
 70
process at defense contractor plants (Sondheimer, 2001). Indirect costs may become 
inflated when TBA is least. During these periods when TBA is declining, and when 
defense contractors are uncertain of future DoD, business can reduce the allocation base, 
increasing risk, and potentially increase indirect rates significantly in the cost estimates 
provided by defense contractors. Furthermore, defense contractors have greater risk in 
planning the allocation of their resources for efficient production. The preference for FP 
contracting during the transition from a greater TBA to a reduced TBA may contradict 
the FAR guidance of choosing a contract type based on a reasonable allocation of risk.  
Historic contract type indictors would have predicted an earlier beginning to the 
most recent FP period. The three-year period following this most recent FP period was 
the first occasion DoD TBA declined following the start to FP period, by 6 percent. 
Should the most recent FP period have begun in 2002, the measure showing the greatest 
correlation to FP periods, DoD TBA, would have aligned more closely to the historical 
trend for FP periods. The most recent shift towards FP contracts, in 2008, neither 
occurred where the historical norm would have predicted, nor when contract risk was 
least to the DoD. 
A declining defense budget and a weak economy suggest that the defense industry 
is not positioned well for the current shift in policy towards FP contracts. A shift towards 
FP contracts following shortly after 9/11 would have aligned closely with historic 
indicators. Five historic shifts in contract type preference cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of such a policy. The logic for a contract type preference seems based less on emerging 
operational requirements for major weapon systems or FAR guidance, and more as a 
response to DoD’s own spending patterns.  
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Perform a study: 
 That focuses on the specific recommendations of significant Acquisition 
reform initiatives. 
 71
 That specifically analyses historic contract type trends against similar 
factors beginning in 1953. Funding levels varied wildly during the Korean 
War years from 1950–1952. 
 That specifically analyses historic contract type trends against similar 
factors beginning in 1991. A new contract type period and defense 
industry period both appear to begin this year. 
 That focuses on the early 2000s. Trends in acquisition culture and the 
composition of the defense marketplace workforce appear to indicate a 
fundamental shift.  
 Studies that expand the scope of public perception as an indicator of 
contract type preference. 
 Use statistical tools to evaluate the strength of the correlation of the 
indicators with contract type preference. Further studies to determine if 
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APPENDIX A 
A. ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES 
The acquisition reform initiates that are used within the analysis of this project are 
listed below. These initiatives significantly shaped the defense acquisition environment, 
and, more precisely, influenced the acquisition process for major weapon systems. 
1. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
(First Hoover Commission), 1949. 
  
2. Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
(Second Hoover Commission), 1955.  
 
3. The Weapons Acquisition Process Study by the Harvard Business School, 1960 
and 1962.  
 
4. The Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), 1962.  
 
5. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission), 1970.  
 
6. Commission on Government Procurement, 1972.  
 
7. Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons, by J. Ronald Fox, 1974.  
 
8. The Defense Resources Board, 1979.  
 
9. The DoD Resources Management Study, 1979.  
 
10. The Carlucci 32 Acquisition Initiatives, 1981.  
 
11. Special Panel on Defense Procurement, 1982.  
 
12. The Defense Industry, by Jacques S. Gansler, 1982.  
 
13. Grace Commission, 1983.  
 
14. Competition in Contracting Act, 1984.  
 
15. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985.  
 
16. President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission), 1986.  
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17. The Defense Management Challenge, by J. R. Fox, 1988.  
 
18. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Defense Management Review, 1989.  
 
19. Affording Defense, by Jacques S. Gansler, 1989.  
 
20. New Weapons, Old Politics, by Thomas L. McNaugher. 1989.  
 
21. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), 1990.  
 
22. Defense Science Board (DSB) Defense Acquisition Reform Study (Phase I), 
1993. 
 
23. Defense Science Board (DSB) Defense Acquisition Reform Study (Phase II), 
1994. 
 
24. Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws Pursuant to 
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Acquisition Category (ACAT) refers generally to the size, complexity, and risk 
of an acquisition program.   
ACAT I programs are Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). An 
MDAP is a program estimated by the USD(AT&L) that requires eventual expenditure for 
RDT&E of more than $365 million (FY 2000 constant dollars) or procurement of more 
than $2.19 billion (FY 2000 constant dollars), or those programs designated by the 
USD(AT&L) to be MDAPs. ACAT I programs may also be those designated by the 
USD(AT&L) as special interest programs. ACAT I Weapon System programs have two 
subcategories:  
ACAT ID. For this program, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is the 
USD (AT&L). The “D” refers to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which advises 
the USD (AT&L) at major decision points. 
ACAT IC. For this program, the MDA is the DoD component head or, if 
delegated, the DoD Component Acquisition Executive (CAE). The “C” refers to 
Component. The USD (AT&L) designates programs as ACAT ID or ACAT IC.  
ACAT II programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet the 
criteria for an ACAT I program, but do meet the criteria for a major system. A major 
system is defined as a program estimated by the DoD Component Head that will 
eventually require expenditure for RDT&E of more than $140 million in FY 2000 
constant dollars, or for procurement of more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant 
dollars or those designated by the DoD Component Head to be ACAT II. The MDA for 
this program is the DoD CAE.  
                                                 
3 Definitions are based on DAU definitions and have been slightly modified or updated. 
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ACAT III programs are defined as those acquisition programs that do not meet 
the criteria for ACAT II. The MDA is designated by the CAE. This category includes 
less-than-major AISs.  
ACAT IV programs are found only in the Navy and Marine Corps and are 
designated as such when they do not qualify as ACAT III programs.  There are two 
categories of ACAT IV programs: IVT and IVM. ACAT IVT programs require 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), and ACAT IVM programs do not.  
Contract Definition Phase (CDP) is the definition requirement phase instituted 
by DoD in the early 1960s in an attempt to obtain lower prices for system development. 
Cost-Reimbursement (CR) Contracts provide for payment of allowable 
incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. The contracts establish an estimate 
of total costs for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that 
contractors may not exceed (except at their own risk) without the approval of the 
contracting officer. CR contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in 
contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with accuracy sufficient enough 
to use any type of fixed-price contract. 
Cost-Plus-a-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Contracts are contracts wherein the contractor is 
reimbursed for allowable, allocable costs. The contractor’s fee is fixed. The price of the 
contract (or the total amount paid to the contractor) is not fixed. 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) means the DoD 
supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  
Department of Defense (DoD) means the Department of Defense, the military 
departments, and the defense agencies. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the regulation for use by federal 
executive agencies for acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds.  
Fixed-Price (FP) Contracts are contracts that provides for a firm price, or, in 
appropriate cases, an adjustable price with a limit to government liability. FP contracts 
providing for an adjustable price may include a ceiling price, a target price (including a 
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target cost), or both. The contracting officer uses firm-fixed-price contracts or FP 
contracts with economic price-adjustment contracts when acquiring commercial items. 
FP contracts place relatively more cost responsibility on the contractor than on the 
government and makes profit a function of the contractor’s ability to manage. 
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contracts are contracts where the amount of payment 
does not depend on the amount of resources or time expended, as opposed to a cost-plus 
contract which is intended to cover the costs plus some amount of profit. Cost 
responsibility is placed wholly on the contractor. FFPs are the preferred type of contract 
when cost risk is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty.  
Fixed-Price with Economic Price Adjustment (FPEPA) are contracts used to 
protect both the government and the contractor when there is serious doubt about the 
stability of labor or material prices during the life of the contract. Price-adjustment 
provisions can provide for both upward and downward adjustments. 
Fixed-Price Incentive Fee (FPIF) Contracts are FP type contracts with 
provisions for the adjustment of profit. The final contract price is based on a comparison 
between the final negotiated total costs and the total target costs.  
Fixed-Price Redetermination (FPR) if prospective, provides for an FFP for an 
initial period of contract performance and for prospective redetermination, upward or 
downward, at predetermined stated times during the performance of the contract. If 
retroactive, the FRP provides for a ceiling price and retroactive price redetermination 
after completion of the contract. 
Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) is an  acquisition program that is 
designated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) 
(USD(AT&L)) as an MDAP, or estimated by the USD(AT&L) to require an eventual 
total expenditure for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) of more 
than 365 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of more 
than 2.19 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars. 
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The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is the principal staff element of 
the SECDEF in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, 
budget, and program evaluation responsibilities. 
The Program Manager (PM) is the designated individual with the responsibility 
and authority to accomplish program objectives for development, production, and 
sustainment in order to meet the user’s operational needs. The PM is accountable for 
credible cost, scheduling, and performance reporting to the MDA. 
Sole-Source Acquisition means a contract for the purchase of supplies or 
services that is entered into or proposed to be entered into by an agency after soliciting 
and negotiating with only one source. 
Total Package Procurement Concept (TPPC) is a method of acquisition that 
involves offering weapon contractors the entire procurement, or the total package, early 
in the development cycle using a FP contract. 
Weapon System is a system that can be used directly by the armed forces to carry 
out combat missions. 
Weapon System Costs equal the sum of the procurement costs for prime mission 
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